Buyers' Guide
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چکیده
PhotonicsViewsVolume 18, Issue 1 p. 85-87 Buyers' GuideFree Access Guide First published: 22 February 2021 https://doi.org/10.1002/phvs.202170115AboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use check box below share version article.I have read accept the Wiley Online Library UseShareable LinkUse link a this article with your friends colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for article. Volume18, Issue1February 2021/March 2021Pages RelatedInformation
منابع مشابه
Managing Strategic Buyers∗
We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some deadline, facing n buyers with independent private values. The monopolist posts prices but has no commitment power. The seller faces a basic trade-off between imperfect price discrimination and maintaining an effective reserve price. When there is only one unit and only a few buyers, the seller essentially posts una...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: PhotonicsViews
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2626-1308', '2626-1294']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/phvs.202170115