منابع مشابه
Cartel versus Merger∗
Procurement practices are affected by the nature of competition among suppliers and by uncertainty about whether suppliers are colluding. A buyer that is dissatisfied with the bids of incumbent bidders, perhaps based on suspicions of collusion, can cancel the procurement and then resolicit bids after qualifying additional suppliers. Recent cartel cases show that cartels devote considerable atte...
متن کاملCartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection
This paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel. Buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous. We find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases. During the transitional phase, price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks. During the stationary phase, price responds to cost but ...
متن کاملMerger to Monopoly to Serve a Single Buyer: Comment
The essential building block for Campbell’s policy recommendation is his assertion that bilateral bargaining between a single seller and a single buyer—as would occur after a merger to monopoly among the sellers that serve that buyer—induces efficient trade. He states: “The overall payment for all the goods will be subject to bargaining between the two parties, but the quantity sold is not in d...
متن کاملProper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review
In this paper, we assess the appropriate treatment of buyer power inmerger review. We conclude that, for changes in bargaining outcomes due to a buyer merger to create efficiencies, it must be the case that, post-merger, the parties are able to arrive at a more optimal price schedule, perhaps due to reduced transactions costs. Empirical tests will be important to the evaluation of such efficien...
متن کاملBuyer-Initiated versus Seller-Initiated Information Revelation
In many selling situations, the firm can choose between a selling format in which the buyer determines which information about the product will be revealed and one in which the seller makes this determination. We model this choice of information revelation format and its interaction with product quality. In a monopoly with exogenous quality, if the firm offers a high quality product it prefers ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.002