Buy-Back Contract Incorporating Fairness in Approach of Stackelberg Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Stackelberg Game Theory Approach
In the Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A) system, Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlying cellular networks can bring some advantages such as high data rates, low delay, low power consumption by reusing frequency bands with cellular user equipments (UEs). While at the same time, inter-cell and intra-cell interference is inevitable. The D2D users and cellular UEs will compete or cooper...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2164-5167,2164-5175
DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2014.41007