Bureaucrats First.
نویسندگان
چکیده
In the 1980s, a fundamental shift took place in Dutch economic policy: Keynesian demand-management was exchanged for neoliberal supply-side approach. The single most influential account of this transformation has focused on consensus among corporatist policymakers as key to reforms. It is origin story ‘polder model’. problem however, that there surprisingly little evidence 1980s. Instead consensus, we argue been conflict ideas between Keynesians and supply-siders. And instead corporatism, point bureaucratic elites crucial factor policy shift. From mid-1970s onwards, an group senior public officials emerged successfully advocated policy, inspired by industrialization policies developed 1950s. so doing, believe case exemplifies pathbreaking role administrative highlighted Skocpol, Weir Heclo, rather than consensus.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2468-9068', '1572-1701']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18352/tseg.1197