Bundling Public with Private Goods

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?∗

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated towards the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis-a-vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that when agent...

Public Supply of Private Goods

Public Provision of Private Goods

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Imperfect Bundling in Public-Private Partnerships

The economic literature on PPPs has generally overlooked agency problems within private consortia. We provide a first contribution in this direction, relying on a simple incomplete contracts framework where a Builder and an Operator set up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to carry out a contract with the government. Because of incomplete contracts, the bundling of tasks is imperfect, and the SPV...

Private provision of discrete public goods

We investigate the private provision of a discrete public good. When the size and decomposition of the group are certain, such a problem has, in general, multiple equilibria. Yet, if it is commonly believed that some individuals may be altruists and that the size of the group is a Poisson random variable then equilibrium is unique. If the decomposition uncertainty is very small and the expected...