Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial auctions
This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Σ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit bids, and the bundles allocated to them, to be in Σ . The Σ-VCG combinatorial auctions obtained in this way are known to be truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VCG auctions,...
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Revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions (and other multidimensional selling settings) is one of the most important and elusive problems in mechanism design. The optimal design is unknown, and is known to include features that are not acceptable in many applications, such as favoring some bidders over others and randomization. In this paper, we instead study a common revenue-enhancement a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00184-2