Budget-constrained Pareto-efficient allocations
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1979
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90046-2