Budget-constrained coalition strategies with discounting
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract Discounting future costs and rewards is a common practice in accounting, game theory machine learning. In spite of this, existing logics for reasoning about strategies with cost resource constraints do not account discounting. The article proposes sound complete logical system budget-constrained strategic abilities that incorporates discounting into its semantics.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Logic and Computation
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1465-363X', '0955-792X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exab071