Budget Allocation in a Competitive Communication Spectrum Economy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Budget Allocation in a Competitive Communication Spectrum Economy
This study discusses how to adjust “monetary budget” to meet each user’s physical power demand or balance all individual utilities in a competitive “spectrum market” of a communication system. In the market, multiple users share a common frequency or tone band and each of them uses the budget to purchase its own transmit power spectra (taking others as given) in maximizing its Shannon utility o...
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Consider a competitive “spectrum economy” in communication system where multiple users share a common frequency band and each of them, equipped with an endowed “monetary” budget, will “purchase” its own transmit power spectra (taking others as given) in maximizing its Shannon utility or pay-off function that includes the effects of interference and subjects to its budget constraint. A market eq...
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Dynamic Spectrum Allocation (DSA) has been viewed as a promising approach to improving spectrum efficiency. With DSA, Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) that operate in fixed spectrum bands allocated through static allocation can solve their short-term spectrum shortage problems resulting from the bursty nature of wireless traffic. Such DSA mechanisms should be coupled with dynamic pricing schem...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1687-6180
DOI: 10.1155/2009/963717