Bubbles and Information in Continuous Double Auction and Call Market: An Experiment

Bubbles and Information: An Experiment

We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. Using the seminal design of Smith et al. (1988) we find that markets where traders are asymmetrically informed about future dividends have smaller, and shorter, bubbles than markets with symmetrically informed or uninformed traders. Hence, fundamental values are better reflected in mark...

A Double Auction Market: Teaching, Experiment, and Theory By

Information perception and price dynamics in a continuous double auction

On using ZCS in a Simulated Continuous Double-Auction Market

This paper presents results from ongoing investigations into the performance of the Michigan-style classifier system in a complex multi-agent environment. Using a simplified model of a continuous double-auction market place the use of ZCS as an adaptive economic trading agent is examined. It is shown that a number of small changes to the basic system greatly improves its performance, resulting ...

Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market.

The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complex...