Bribery: Greed versus Reciprocity

Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery

This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do ...

Imitative Trust versus Indirect Reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that allows cooperation to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence, in particular laboratory experiments, show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies involving both reciprocity and i...

Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among Organizations

Extensive interdisciplinary literatures have built on the seminal spatial dilemmas model, which depicts the evolution of cooperation on regular lattices, with strategies propagating locally by relative fitness. In this model agents may cooperate with neighbors, paying an individual cost to enhance their collective welfare, or they may exploit cooperative neighbors and diminish collective welfar...

Ordered Greed

Swap Bribery

In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is asked to implement. Specifically, in our model the briber can change a voter’s preferen...