Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets

Reward Self-Reporting to Deter Corruption: An Experiment on Mitigating Collusive Bribery

This paper investigates the effectiveness of offering rewards for self reports as a means of combating collusive bribery. Rewarding self reporting theoretically sows distrust between parties tempted to exchange bribes and may reduce bribery even where authorities are otherwise ineffective in uncovering corruption. Our results indicate that offering rewards is weakly effective in reducing collus...

Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A …rst-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted o¤ers before the o¢ cial opening. The agent may be corrupt, i.e. willing to “sell”his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent’s incentives to ...

Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices∗

Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms’ prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of...

Who Gains from Non-Collusive Corruption?

Non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity, is particularly widespread in low-income countries. We build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption. We find that credit market imperfections, by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneu...

Bribery and the Nature of Corruption