Branching Time Logic, Perfect Information Games and Backward Induction

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Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction

The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been explored within the con ̄nes of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a di®erent branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. The branching time framework is extended by adding agents and by de ̄ning the notion of prediction. A sy...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 1999

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.140988