Bounding Revenue Comparisons across Multi-Unit Auction Formats under ε-Best Response
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.2.455