Bounding messages for free in security protocols – extension to various security properties
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bounding messages for free in security protocols - extension to various security properties
The verification of security protocols has been proven to be undecidable in general. Different approaches use simplifying hypotheses in order to obtain decidability for interesting subclasses. Amongst the most common is type abstraction, i.e. considering only well-typed runs, therefore bounding message length. In this paper we show how to get message boundedness “for free” under a reasonable (s...
متن کاملBounding Messages for Free in Security Protocols
The verification of security protocols has been proven to be undecidable in general. Different approaches use simplifying hypotheses in order to obtain decidability for interesting subclasses. Amongst the most common is type abstraction, i.e. considering only well-typed runs, therefore bounding message length. In this paper we show how to get message boundedness “for free” under a reasonable (s...
متن کاملTyping Messages for Free in Security Protocols: The Case of Equivalence Properties
Privacy properties such as untraceability, vote secrecy, or anonymity are typically expressed asbehavioural equivalence in a process algebra that models security protocols. In this paper, we study how todecide one particular relation, namely trace equivalence, for an unbounded number of sessions.Our first main contribution is to reduce the search space for attacks. Specifically, we ...
متن کاملSecurity aspects of distance-bounding protocols
Authentication protocols, run between a so-called prover and a so-called verifier, enable the verifier to decide whether a prover is legitimate or not. Such protocols enable access control, and are used in e.g. logistics, public transport, or personal identification. An authentication protocol is considered secure if an adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate prover. Such an adversary may eav...
متن کاملSecurity Analysis of Two Distance-Bounding Protocols
In this paper, we analyze the security of two recently proposed distance bounding protocols called the “Hitomi” and the “NUS” protocols. Our results show that the claimed security of both protocols has been overestimated. Namely, we show that the Hitomi protocol is susceptible to a full secret key disclosure attack which not only results in violating the privacy of the protocol but also can be ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Information and Computation
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0890-5401
DOI: 10.1016/j.ic.2014.09.003