Borrower Mobility, Adverse Selection, and Mortgage Points
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Intermediation
سال: 1994
ISSN: 1042-9573
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1994.1012