Borda efficiency of constant scoring rules with large electorates
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
In an election, an alternative is said to be a strong Condorcet winner when more than 50% of the voters rank this alternative first in their preference orders. The strong Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the probability of electing the strong Condorcet winner, given that such an alternative exists. In this paper, we provide some analytical representations for the strong Condo...
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The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate that would be able to defeat each of the other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that it would elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. A closed form representation is obtained for the Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule in three candi...
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Positional scoring rules in voting compute the score of an alternative by summing the scores for the alternative induced by every vote. This summation principle ensures that all votes contribute equally to the score of an alternative. We relax this assumption and, instead, aggregate scores by taking into account the rank of a score in the ordered list of scores obtained from the votes. This def...
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We study the asymptotic average minimum manipulating coalition size as a characteristic of quality of a voting rule and show its serious drawback. We suggest using the asymptotic average threshold coalition size instead. We prove that, in large electorates, the asymptotic average threshold coalition size is maximised among all scoring rules by the Borda rule when the number m of alternatives is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: RAIRO - Operations Research
سال: 1981
ISSN: 0399-0559,1290-3868
DOI: 10.1051/ro/1981150302871