منابع مشابه
Values of Non - Atomic Vector Measure Games
Consider non-atomic vector measure games; i.e., games u of the form u = f o(pI.. . ,p.), where (pIr.. .,p.) is a vector of non-atomic non-negative measures and f is a real-valued function defined on the range of (pi,. . .,pi.). Games of this form arise, for example, from production models and from finite-type markets. We show that the value of such a game need not be a linear combination of the...
متن کاملNot-Quite Non-Atomic Games: Values and Cores of Large Games
Non-atomic games were first introduced in several articles by Aumann and Shapley, which eventually culminated in their definitive book [1974, here denoted A/S]. We note that this was not the first treatment of games with a continuum of players; other articles, notably by Shapley et al., had done so. It is in A/S, however, that a rigorous definition of such games, and their meaning, first appear...
متن کاملA Non-standard Analysis of Aumann-Shapley Random Order Values of Non-atomic Games
Using techniques from the non-standard analysis, a non-standard analogue of the AumannShapley random order value of non-atomic games is provided. The paper introduces the notion of effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups. It is shown that for a wide class of games, the non-standard random order value with respect to an effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups coincides with t...
متن کاملCores of non-atomic market games
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some representation results. We ...
متن کاملStrategic behavior in non-atomic games ¬リニ
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a non-atomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a strategy is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society
سال: 1975
ISSN: 0002-9904
DOI: 10.1090/s0002-9904-1975-13732-3