Bonuses, overtime, and employment: Korea vs Japan

Japan - Korea

Optimal Sales Force Compensation in Dynamic Settings: Commissions vs. Bonuses

This paper studies optimal sales force compensation plans in a multi-period moral-hazard model when the firm wants to implement high effort in every period but only obtains aggregate information on sales. The sales agent chooses effort each period after observing previous sales and his incentive responsiveness might change over time. The paper derives conditions under which a linear incentive s...

Cross - sectional wage and employment rigidities vs . aggregate employment

When studying real-life market outcomes and evaluating policy interventions, economists like to refer to a hypothetical situation where intertemporal and insurance markets are perfect and complete. In reality, of course, laissez faire economic interactions can hardly supply insurance against the risk of becoming or remaining unemployed, because moral hazard and adverse selection stand in the wa...

Minimum Wages and Employment in Japan

This paper surveys issues associated with the minimum wage and its economic impacts in Japan. First, I discuss how the minimum wage is discussed in recent political debates. Next, I explain economic factors surrounding the Japanese labor market that are related to the minimum wage: specifically, I take up the issues of globalization and “mismatch” (i.e., a labor shortage exists in some industri...

Dopamine: generalization and bonuses

In the temporal difference model of primate dopamine neurons, their phasic activity reports a prediction error for future reward. This model is supported by a wealth of experimental data. However, in certain circumstances, the activity of the dopamine cells seems anomalous under the model, as they respond in particular ways to stimuli that are not obviously related to predictions of reward. In ...