<b>Management Ownership and Risk-Shifting Investment</b>
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ownership structure, Voting and Risk
We analyze the determinants of ownership structure in firms when conflicts of interest on risk arise endogenously via different ownership stakes and firm decisions are made through majority voting. A large block is chosen to incentivize monitoring. Because a large blockholder holds a large share of the firm, he is averse to risky investing. This generates a conflict of interest with dispersed s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Japanese Accounting Review
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2185-4785,2185-4793
DOI: 10.11640/tjar.2.2012_75