Blockchain-Driven Supply Chain’s Financing and Coordination Strategy under Nash Bargaining Scheme

نویسندگان

چکیده

Blockchain-driven supply chain finance (SCF) has become an emerging financing mode. Compared with the traditional SCF mode, blockchain-driven can shorten transaction process and provide real trade data that cannot be tampered with, thereby improving efficiency of capital operation. This article explores coordination problems a chain. Based on three most common contracts (revenue-sharing contract, profit-sharing two-part tariff contract), we construct comparative model bank credit (BCF) SCF, discuss optimal decision-making strategy chain, quantitatively analyze performance under each The results show following: (i) there is threshold for usage rate platform; (ii) only when platform lower than threshold, mode which benefits both manufacturer retailer better choice; (iii) above always hold if coordinate in terms quantity decisions; (iv) more efficient chains are less capital-constrained. provides decision basis selection channels idea future research SCF.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Complexity

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1099-0526', '1076-2787']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1155/2023/9670398