Blindfold Games are Harder than Games with Perfect Information

Games with Perfect Information

Perfect-Information Games with Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs

We prove that every multi-player perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is...

Dynamic Games with Perfect Awareness Information

I study dynamic games where players may be unaware of some fundamentals of the game itself, such as actions or players, and such unawareness may be lifted by other players’ actions during the play. Based on Li (2006a, 2006b), I propose a framework to deal with such games using standard tools of game theory. I construct examples to show that unawareness is distinctly different from assigning zer...

Weighted Discounted Stochastic Games with Perfect Information

We consider a two-person zero-sum stochastic game with an innnite time horizon. The payoo is a linear combination of expected total discounted rewards with diierent discount factors. For a model with a countable state space and compact action sets, we characterize the set of persistently optimal (sub-game perfect) policies. For a model with nite state and action sets and with perfect informatio...

Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information

Standard structures of information, in particular partition structures, are inadequate for the modeling of strategic thinking. They fail to capture the inner structure of hypotheses players make about situations they know will not occur. An extension of the partition structure is proposed in which such hypotheses can be modeled in detail. Hypothetical knowledge operators are defined for extende...