BIOSPHERE RESERVES AND MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: SOME LEGAL ISSUES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Interlinkages: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Trade and Investment Regimes
The Kyoto Protocol incorporates the international flexibility mechanisms such as emissions trading, etc., in addition to setting the quantified commitments for Annex I Parties. The Protocol also recognizes the importance of domestic actions, and supports the concept of supplementarity in Articles 6 and 17. The EU proposes to limit the tradeable amounts of emissions to meet this concept. A new i...
متن کاملThe Big Chill: The WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements*
If sustainable development is about the integration of economic and environmental goals, then there seems to be a signiacant lack of integration between the preeminent global governance structures set up to manage trade and environment respectively. The international trade regime has evolved into one of the most powerful and inouential multilateral regimes in the world today in terms of its abi...
متن کاملRemote Sensing in Support of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
The rapid growth in the number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs, or “environmental treaties”) since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment has been an encouraging sign of international commitment to protecting the environment. The proliferation of treaties, up from 140 in 1970 to over 350 today (IUCN 1998), has resulted in an attendant need for spatial data on the health...
متن کاملSome legal and technical issues related to water-spreading weirs
Indigenous flood harvesting method for irrigation in Khorasan, which are called water-spreading weir are constructed and operated by farmers without any cost to the government. Although, the benefits of water-spreading weirs are clear for many experts and the authorities as well, this method receives a little attention by governmental soil and water conservation services. This problem and a few...
متن کاملForbearance in optimal multilateral trade agreements∗
I present a theory of optimal multilateral trade agreements with public political shocks. I show that “forbearance” where one country withholds retaliation when its trading partner receives a shock is a feature of an optimal agreement. This provides a rationale for countries not acting on retaliatory rights granted under GATT. I show that there is a limit to forbearance allowable in a self-enfo...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the National Science Foundation of Sri Lanka
سال: 2003
ISSN: 2362-0161,1391-4588
DOI: 10.4038/jnsfsr.v31i1-2.3038