منابع مشابه
Bidding With Securities: Comment
Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005, henceforth DKS) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment, we obtain the opposite results to DKS’s by assuming that a higher return requires a hig...
متن کاملBidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the asset’s realized value. In formal security-bid auctions, the seller restricts the security design to an ordered set and uses a standard auction format (e.g., first or secondprice). In informal settings, bidders offer arbitrary securities and the seller chooses the...
متن کاملOn Bidding with Securities: Risk Aversion and Positive Dependence
Article history: Received 7 May 2013 Available online 9 February 2015 JEL classification: D44 D82 G00
متن کاملComment on “Securities Transaction Taxes and Financial Markets”
The paper “Securities Transaction Taxes and Financial Markets” by Karl Habermeier and Andrew Kirilenko is an excellent overview of the literature and key issues related to securities transaction taxes (hereafter referred to as STTs). The paper does a particularly good job of linking arguments from very different strands of literature—ranging from work on market microstructure to corporate finan...
متن کاملProcurement Bidding with Restrictions
In many procurement situations with simultaneously offered projects, firms face participation restrictions and can bid only on a subset of the projects. This phenomenon is prevalent in a variety of observed situations such as bidding for private label supplies, business to business procurement or government projects. We show that for the case of n bidding firms where each is restricted to bid o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1929