منابع مشابه
Bidder Motives in Cause Related Auctions
A cause-related auction is different from a list price setting in two major ways: First, the donation percentage directly affects the price of the item in that consumers’ value for charitable contributions enters their bids. Second, charitable consumers have a price externality on non-charitable consumers, so even a segment of consumers who place a premium on charitable contributions can signif...
متن کاملComplexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions
We extend the finite automata approach to evaluate complexity of strategies in iterative adjustment processes such as auctions. Intuitively, a strategy’s complexity is equal to the number of different contingencies in which qualitatively different behaviors are prescribed. Complexity may explain bidder choice of strategies in multi-unit iterative auctions. JEL classification codes: D44, C73
متن کاملStrategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions
We examine prior and current sponsored search auctions and find evidence of strategic bidder behavior. Between June 15, 2002, and June 14, 2003, we estimate that Overture’s revenue from sponsored search could have been more than 60% higher if it had been able to prevent this strategic behavior. We also show that advertisers’ strategic behavior has not disappeared over time; rather, such behavio...
متن کاملThe Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion
This is a revised version of The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion, in Game Theory and Business Applications (Kalyan Chatterjee & William F. Samuelson eds., 2001). The content draws signi cantly from two earlier papers by authors Marshall and Meurer: Bidder Collusion: A Basic Analysis of Some Fundamental Issues,and Should Bid-Rigging Always be an Antitrust Violation?We thank Vikra...
متن کاملPosition Auctions with Bidder-Specific Minimum Prices
Position auctions such as the Generalized Second Price (GSP) are commonly used for sponsored search, e.g., by Yahoo! and Google. We now have an understanding of the equilibria of these auctions, via game-theoretic concepts like Generalized English Auctions and the “locally envy-free” property, as well as through a relationship to the well-known, truthful Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. I...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Research in Marketing
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0167-8116
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijresmar.2009.07.001