Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions
This paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible. It presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme with co-ordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders’ payoffs. The paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterises the equilibrium payof...
متن کاملBid rotation and collusion in repeated
This paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible. It presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme which coordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders’ payoffs. The paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium payof...
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I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.
متن کاملTacit collusion in repeated auctions
This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to availability of transfers. Monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus. A folk theorem proved by Fudenberg at al. shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if pl...
متن کاملEfficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders’ payoff is close to what they get when the ob...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00071-1