Bid Increment Adjusting Strategies in English Auction-based Sponsored Search
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bid Increment Adjusting Strategies in English Auction-based Sponsored Search
English auctions are applied in many current e-commerce applications because of the easy implementation. Some sponsored search advertising (SSA) services consider the ascending bidding rules of English auctions to determine winners. However, the high computation cost of determining winners is the major drawback of the English auction-based SSAs. Because the SSA is an online service, Internet us...
متن کاملA Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction
∗ Financial support was received from the Center for Rationality, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 373 (“Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse”), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, the Koret Foundation, and the EUTMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238). We are grateful to Filippo Caffarelli for bringing to our attention the ENI auction pro...
متن کاملSponsored Search Auction Design via Machine Learning∗
In this work we use techniques from the study of samplecomplexity in machine learning to reduce revenue maximizing auction problems to standard algorithmic questions. These results are particularly relevant to designing good pricing mechanisms for sponsored search. In particular we apply our results to two problems: profit maximizing combinatorial auctions, and auctions for pricing semantically...
متن کاملExperimental Evaluation of Sponsored Search Auction Mechanisms
The theory of sponsored search has been developing rapidly although with disagreement in scientific circles on answers to some basic questions about sponsored search. This study focuses on two of these questions, namely, if a search engine seeks to maximize profits, 1) what should its pricing policy be and 2) what should its ranking policy be. This paper uses experiments with economically motiv...
متن کاملA Sealed–Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction1
This paper analyzes a two–stage sealed–bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. JEL classifications: D44 (Auctions)
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Mathematics & Information Sciences
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1935-0090,2325-0399
DOI: 10.12785/amis/080355