Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
Article history: Received 25 April 2011 Available online 26 June 2015 JEL classification: D72 D44
متن کاملEndogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.
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At procurement auctions, with bid preferences, qualified firms are treated special. A common policy involves scaling the bids of preferred firms by a discount factor for the purposes of evaluation only. Introducing such an asymmetry has three effects: first, preferred firms may inflate their bids, yet still win the auction; second, nonpreferred firms may bid more aggressively than in the absenc...
متن کاملBid deterrence
In a second-price auction with costly bidding, bidders can deter others from participating by publicly pre-committing to bid. Such “bid deterrence” increases total welfare when the reserve price is given, but allows the seller to increase expected revenue when the seller can pre-commit to a reserve price. JEL Codes: D44.
متن کاملAuctions and Bid Rigging
An auction is “a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants” (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).1 Auctions are among the oldest market institutions; “marriage auctions” for brides were used in Babylon as early as 500 BC. Products commonly bought and sold using auctions include art and jewelry, US Treasur...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.2307/3087482