Biased monitors: Corporate governance when managerial ability is mis-assessed
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Preferences , Corporate Governance , and Financial Structure ∗
Conflicts of interest between insiders (e.g, controlling shareholders) and outsiders (e.g., minority shareholders) are central to the analysis of modern corporation. In an integrated continuous-time contingent claims framework with imperfect corporate governance, we examine a controlling shareholder’s optimal choice of capital structure, ownership concentration, private benefit diversion, consu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0889-1583
DOI: 10.1016/j.jjie.2017.10.005