Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment in a Mixed Duopoly

Strategic Delegation in an Experimental Mixed Duopoly

We provide the first test of the consequences of delegation in a mixed duopoly. Such delegation allows a profit maximizing private owner and a welfare maximizing public owner to give a separate weight to sales in managerial contracts. Theory predicts that such contracts improve welfare. Our experimental evidence indicates that both public and private owners do provide a weight on sales consiste...

Mixed Bundling in Duopoly

We present a model where producers of complementary goods have the option to practice mixed bundling. In the first stage of a two-stage game, firms choose between a mixed bundling and a non-bundling strategy. In the second stage, firms choose prices. We show that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy for both firms. However, when the composite goods are not very close substitutes, at the bundli...

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly

This paper addresses the issue of endogenizing the equilibrium solution when a private –domestic or foreign –…rm competes in the quantities with a public, welfare maximizing …rm. Theoretical literature on mixed oligopolies provides results and policy implications that crucially rely on the notion of equilibrium assumed, either sequential or simultaneous. In the framework of the endogenous timin...

Compare of the Effectiveness of Organizational Commitment Training as a Professional Ethics component on Productivity and Organizational Commitment in Managers

Background: One of the most important issues in the empowerment and development of managers is to pay attention to organizational commitment and its effect on organizational commitment and productivity in organization managers. Therefore, this research compares the effectiveness of organizational commitment training on the productivity and organizational commitment of managers and project manag...

Commitment in R&D Tournaments via Strategic Delegation to Overoptimistic Managers