Beyond agency and stewardship theory: shareholder–manager relationships and governance structures in family firms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Governance beyond Agency Theory : the Tale of Dual Class Firms
This paper attempts to investigate the theoretical underpinnings for the reasons why firms frequently adopt the dual class equity structure, i.e. a capital (or ownership) structure based on the issuance of shares with differential voting rights (DeAngelo et al. 1985). Such an ownership structure is justified by some researchers as a defensive structure adopted by the directors and managers of a...
متن کامل3 Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory : CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns
Agency theory argues that shareholder interests require protection by separation of incumbency of rôles of board chair and CEO. Stewardship theory argues shareholder interests are maximised by shared incumbency of these rôles. Results of an empirical test fail to support agency theory and provide some support for stewardship theory.
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Agency theory argues that shareholder interests require protection by separation of incumbency of rôles of board chair and CEO. Stewardship theory argues shareholder interests are maximised by shared incumbency of these rôles. Results of an empirical test fail to support agency theory and provide some support for stewardship theory.
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the emergence and unprecedented growth of joint stock companies is undoubtedly one of the most significant economic developments.one of the outcomes of this development is the separation of ownership and control of the companies. such separation make it possible for the managers of the companies to make dicisions to serve their interes at the expense of the companies shareholders .this conflict...
متن کاملFamily Firms, Corporate Governance and Export
This paper investigates the effects of family ownership on export using rich data on Italian firms. We find that family ownership increases the probability that firms export. This benefit is especially pronounced when family owners retain control rights and seek the support of external managers. The results suggest that families better internalize the long-run benefits of internationalization, ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Decision
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0025-1747
DOI: 10.1108/md-03-2018-0316