Bet and Attack: Incentive Compatible Collaborative Attacks Using Smart Contracts

نویسندگان

چکیده

Smart contract-enabled blockchains allow building decentralized applications in which mutually-distrusted parties can work together. Recently, oracle services emerged to provide these with real-world data feeds. Unfortunately, capabilities have been used for malicious purposes under what is called criminal smart contracts. A few works explored this dark side and showed a variety of such attacks. However, none them considered collaborative attacks against targets that reside outside the blockchain ecosystem. In paper, we bridge gap introduce contract-based framework allows sponsor orchestrate attack among (pseudo)anonymous attackers reward that. While all previous required technique quantify an attacker's individual contribution, could be infeasible respect targets, our avoids This done by developing novel scheme trustless collaboration through betting. That is, bet on event (i.e., takes place) then making happen perform attack). By taking DDoS as usecase, formulate attackers' interaction game, formally prove will collaborate proportion amount their bets game's unique equilibrium. We also model its function incentive mechanism it strategy proof budget-balanced one. Finally, conduct numerical simulations demonstrate equilibrium behavior framework.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Lecture Notes in Computer Science

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1611-3349', '0302-9743']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_16