منابع مشابه
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Under many protocols — in computerized settings and in economics settings — participants repeatedly “best respond” to each others’ actions until the system “converges” to an equilibrium point. We ask when such myopic “local rationality” implies “global rationality”, i.e., when is it best for a player, given that the others are repeatedly best-responding, to also repeatedly best-respond? We exhi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.004