Best-response dynamics in zero-sum stochastic games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Convergence of “Best-response Dynamics” in Zero-sum Stochastic Games
Given a two-player zero-sum discounted-payoff stochastic game, we introduce three classes of continuous-time best-response dynamics, stopping-time best-response dynamics, closed-loop best-response dynamics, and open-loop best-response dynamics. We show the global convergence of the first two classes to the set of minimax strategy profiles, and the convergence of the last class when the players ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105095