Bertrand Price Undercutting: A Brief Classroom Demonstration

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Bertrand Price Undercutting: a Brief Classroom Demonstration

Acknowledgement: I appreciate the constructive comments of Andrew Austin and three anonymous referees for the Journal of Economic Education. Abstract I present a brief classroom demonstration illustrating Bertrand price undercutting. The classroom demonstration is appropriate for Micro Principles, and both intermediate and upper level undergraduate, as well as graduate classes in micro, Industr...

متن کامل

A Simple Classroom Demonstration of Natural Convection

This article explains a simple way to demonstrate natural convection, such as from a lit candle, in the classroom using an overhead projector. The demonstration is based on the principle of schlieren imaging, commonly used to visualize variations in density for gas flows.

متن کامل

Bertrand ' s price competition in markets with fixed costs

We analyze Bertrand’s price competition in a homogenous good market with a fixed cost and an increasing marginal cost (i.e., with variable returns to scale). If the fixed cost is avoidable, we show that the non-subadditivity of the cost function at the output corresponding to the oligopoly break-even price, denoted by D(pL(n)), is sufficient to guarantee that the market supports an equilibrium ...

متن کامل

The Dynamics of Bertrand Price Competition with Cost-Reducing Investments†

We present a dynamic extension of the classic static model of Bertrand price competition that allows competing duopolists to undertake cost-reducing investments in an attempt to “leapfrog” their rival to attain low-cost leadership — at least temporarily. We show that leapfrogging occurs in equilibrium, resolving the Bertrand investment paradox., i.e. leapfrogging explains why firms have an ex a...

متن کامل

Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly

We consider the issue of firstversus second-mover advantage in differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs. We generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and/or complements, dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions. We show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 2003

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.317865