Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment

Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value

Does knowledge matter ? There are actually at least two questions behind this broad one. The first is whether the value of knowledge is independent from other epistemic values, such as the value of truth, or the value of having true beliefs. The second is whether knowledge, as an epistemic value is independent from other values, such as the good or freedom, which are practical or ethical values...

Epistemic Injustice and Illness

This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types o...

Epistemic injustice in psychiatry

It has been argued that those who suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice (a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject) than healthy people. This editorial claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than those with somatic illnesses. Two kinds of contributory factors are outlined, global and sp...

The Nature of Epistemic Injustice

stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge

Several authors have recently defended the thesis that whether someone knows something can depend on actual or perceived practical factors of her situation, in addition to whether she believes it, the reasons for which she believes it, the available evidence, the truth-conduciveness of her environment, whether her faculties are reliable, and such other mundane factors on which knowledge is ordi...