Believing for Practical Reasons

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Theophylline again? Reasons for believing.

S o, what is new for theophylline in asthma? Theophylline has been used over the last 70 years for treating patients with asthma. It is well known as a bronchodilator and the current asthma guidelines recommend it as an add-on therapy in noncontrolled asthmatics [1]. More than a decade ago, EVANS et al. [2] showed that adding theophylline is equally effective as doubling inhaled cortico-steroid...

متن کامل

Practical Reasons and Moral ‘Ought’

Morality is a source of reasons for action, what philosophers call practical reasons. Kantians say that it ‘gives’ reasons to everyone. We can even think of moral requirements as amounting to particularly strong or stringent reasons, in an effort to demystify deontological views like Kant’s, with its insistence on inescapable or ‘binding’ moral requirements or ‘oughts.’1 When we say that someon...

متن کامل

'ought', 'can', and Practical Reasons 1

As intuitive as OIC might seem, we should acknowledge that the arguments offered in its support often do not warrant the sort of confidence many of us have in the principle. For example, friends of OIC often say that the principle is needed to explain certain linguistic behaviors. 3 Suppose Smith sees Jones sitting in a chair and Jones tells Smith that he has just been robbed. 'You ought to cal...

متن کامل

Believing For a Reason

This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. I argue that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.

متن کامل

Responsibility for believing

1 Robert Adams argues against this assumption, providing counter-examples, in “Involuntary Sins,” Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 3–31. For a more recent argument against the assumption, see Angela M. Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (January 2005): 236–71. The assumption seems to appear in the opening of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Noûs

سال: 2018

ISSN: 0029-4624,1468-0068

DOI: 10.1111/nous.12253