Belief networks revisited

Belief Networks Revisited

Desire-as-belief revisited

On Humeís account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very di§erent kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agentís belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agentís desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its trut...

Belief Update Revisited

Although many papers about belief update have been written, its precise scope still remains unclear. In this paper we aim at identifying this scope, and we show that belief update is a specific case of feedback-free action progression. This strong connection with the field of reasoning about action leads us to reconsider belief update and investigate new issues, especially reverse update, which...

Belief Revision Revisited

In this paper, we propose a new belief revision operator, together with a method of its calculation. Our formalization differs from most of the traditional approaches in two respects. Firstly, we formally distinguish between defeasible observations and indefeasible knowledge about the considered world. In particular, our operator is differently specified depending on whether an input formula is...

Belief networks / Bayesian networks

Introduction In modeling real world tasks, one inevitably has to deal with uncertainty. This uncertainty is due to the fact that many facts are unknown and or simply ignored and summarized. Suppose that one morning you find out that your grass is wet. Is it due to rain, or is it due to the sprinkler? If there is no other information, you can only talk in terms of probabilities. In a probabilist...