Belief Free Incomplete Information Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information∗
We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players’ continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free...
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Drawing on ideas from game theory and quantum physics, we investigate nonlocal correlations from the point of view of equilibria in games of incomplete information. These equilibria can be classified in decreasing power as general communication equilibria, beliefinvariant equilibria and correlated equilibria, all of which contain the familiar Nash equilibria. The notion of belief-invariant equi...
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We consider two partition models to be compatible if they render the same set of hierarchies of beliefs over a given set of underlying uncertainties. A model is reduced if only one partition element corresponds to each hierarchy. We show how to generate all models in a compatible class from the reduced model by introducing a state-dependent correlating mechanism which reveals different informat...
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We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with an arbitrary number of players and arbitrary information structures. This generalizes Hörner and Lovo (2008), which restrict attention to the two-player case and to information structures that have a product structure. Our characterization requires introducing a new type of individual rational c...
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We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N ≥ 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1015247