Behaviorally Rational Expectations and Almost Self-Fulfilling Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ambiguity and rational expectations equilibria∗
This paper proves the existence and robustness of partially-revealing rational expectations equilibria (REE) when this equilibrium concept is expanded to allow for some agents to have preferences that display ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, the generic existence of fullyrevealing REE is proven for a commonly-used subset of the class of ambiguity averse preferences. This finding illustrates tha...
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This paper demonstrates that when the concept of Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is expanded to allow for agents whose preferences display ambiguity aversion, standard results on REE no longer hold.In particular, REE can be partially revealing over a set of parameters with positive Lebesgue measure. This finding illustrates that models with ambiguity averse investors provide a relativel...
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In this paper we examine a representative agent forecasting prices in a first-order self-referential overlapping generations model. We first consider intermediate stage learning, where agents update the forecasting rule every m periods. We show that, in theory and simulations, the learning rule does not converge to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). We next consider two stage learning...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2369805