Behavioral strong implementation
نویسندگان
چکیده
Choice behavior is rational if it based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines questions implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice need not be and coalition formation must taken into account. Our model implies that with non-rational players, groups greatly affects design exercise. As by-product, we also propose notion behavioral efficiency compare existing notions.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1432-0479', '0938-2259']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01494-0