Behavior, valuation, and pragmatism in C.I. Lewis and W.V. Quine

I explore three points about the relationship between C.I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism and W.V. Quine’s naturalized epistemology inspired by Robert Sinclair’s Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. First, highlight long-standing commitment to Platonism meaning its connection his reflective philosophical method rejection of a linguistic account analyticity. Second, consider claim that “Lewis’s provides no indication concerning how, despite different sensory experiences, we still come agree on what are talking counts as evidence” (2022, 113). find more hints, especially in how verify two people share common. However, some pragmatic broadly empirical factors Lewis appeals not part epistemology. Finally, relate these (1953/1980) advance “thorough pragmatism” than Lewis. Quine does say much action, value, ethics, but central parts source reluctance abandon those Sinclair argues found dispensable.