Bayesian Persuasion

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Bayesian Persuasion

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a ...

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Bayesian Persuasion Online Appendix

1 Persuasion mechanisms In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal π whose realization is observed by Receiver who then takes her action. In Subsection 2.3 we made an observation that Sender's gain from persuasion is weakly greater in this game than in any other communication game. In this section of the Online Appendix we provide a formal statement and proof of this...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Circulation

سال: 1999

ISSN: 0009-7322,1524-4539

DOI: 10.1161/01.cir.100.16.e68