Bayesian learning in normal form games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games
This paper studies myopic Bayesian learning processes for finite-player, finitestrategy normal form games. Initially, each player is presumed to know his own payoff function but not the payoff functions of the other players. Assuming that the common prior distribution of payoff functions satisfies independence across players, it is proved that the conditional distributions on strategies converg...
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The single-agent multi-armed bandit problem can be solved by an agent that learns the values of each action using reinforcement learning. However, the multi-agent version of the problem, the iterated normal form game, presents a more complex challenge, since the rewards available to each agent depend on the strategies of the others. We consider the behavior of valuebased learning agents in this...
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We study the problem of achieving cooperation between two self-interested agents that play a sequence of randomly generated normal form games, each game played only once. To achieve cooperation we extend a model used to explain cooperative behavior by humans. We show how a modification of a pre-regularized particle filter can be used to detect the cooperation level of the opponent and play acco...
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In this paper we introduce the class of additive normal form games, which is a subset of normal form games. In additive normal form games, the actions of each agent contribute some amount to the final payoff of all the agents. The contributions of the agents are assumed to be additive. We discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for a normal form game to be an additive normal form game a...
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In single-person decision theory, Bayesian rationality requires the agent first to attach subjective probabilities to each uncertain event, and then to maximize the expected value of a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function (or NMUF) that is unique up to a cardinal equivalence class. When the agent receives new information, it also requires subjective probabilities to be revised according to ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90005-y