Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bayesian Games with Unawareness and Unawareness Perfection∗
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibri...
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We provide a tool to model and solve strategic situations where players reasoning is limited, in the sense that they may only be aware of, or model, some of the aspects of the strategic situations at hand, as well as situations where players realize that other players’ perceptions may be limited. We define normal, repeated, incomplete information, and dynamic (extensive) form games with unaware...
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The subjective framework for reasoning is extended to incorporate the representation of unawareness in games. Both unawareness of actions and decision makers are modeled as well as reasoning about others’ unawareness. It is shown that a small grain of uncertainty about unawareness with rational decision makers can lead to cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. JEL Classificati...
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Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of dynamic psychological games and the recent progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness, we provide a general framework that allows for unawareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by belief-dependent psychological preferences like reciprocity and guilt. We show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the strateg...
متن کاملThe Strategic Equivalence of Games with Unawareness
An equivalence relation is more transparent when complemented by an explicit specification of the set of transformations under which equivalence is preserved. In the case of extensive games equivalent with respect to their strategic normal form, the set of transformations was provided by Thompson (1952). We extend Thompson’s result to the case of games with unawareness (Feinberg (2009))
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0788-5