Bayesian games with intentions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bayesian Games with Intentions
We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games [5], and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a s...
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Unlike the previous notes, the material here is perfectly standard and can be found in the usual textbooks: see, e.g., Fudenberg-Tirole. For the examples in these notes (except for the very last section), I draw heavily on Martin Osborne’s excellent recent text, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. Obviously, incomplete information games — in which one or more players are pr...
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We introduce communication and with it the ability to deceive other players about a player’s own intentions into the standard model of 2-player strategic form games. Communication facilitates “commitment” that expands the set of equilibrium outcomes of the game. We show that successful costly deception may arise in equilibrium despite the inherent tension between successful costly deception and...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.003