Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

A Bayesian Clearing Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions

We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent valuations and market prices such that clearing prices become maximum a posteriori estimates given observed agent valuations. This generative model then forms ...

Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey

Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes and furniture. Because of complementarities (or substitution effects) between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets or bundles of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or co...

Experiments on Combinatorial Auctions

This paper contains the description of experiments done so far in the combinatorial auction scenario. We describe the computee side and the society side. In this context we introduce also external objects providing services to the computees themselves, and in particular implementing a complex optimization algorithm. Experimental results are given for a traditional combinatorial auction and for ...

Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Efficient Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

This survey considers the following setting. A seller wants to sell a set of indivisible goods. A set of buyers are interested in buying the goods. Buyers have private values for bundles of goods they are interested in buying. The seller’s objective is to allocate the goods to the buyers efficiently (maximizing the total utility of buyers). Since the values of buyers are private information, th...