Bayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories

Several philosophers and psychologists have characterized belief in conspiracy theories as a product of irrational reasoning. Proponents apparently resist revising their beliefs given disconfirming evidence tend to believe more than one conspiracy, even when the relevant are mutually inconsistent. In this paper, we bring leading views on theoretic closer together by exploring rationality under probabilistic framework. We question claim that irrationality stems from an inadequate response internal incoherence. Drawing analogies Lakatosian research programs, argue maintaining core can be Bayes-rational it is embedded network auxiliary beliefs, which revised protect central disconfirmation. propose (ir)rationality associated with lies not flawed updating method, but failure converge toward well-confirmed, stable networks long run. This approach only reconciles previously disjointed views, also points specific hypotheses explaining why some agents may prone adopting theories.