Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probabil...

Bargaining with non-convexities

We show that in the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game, a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in pure stationary strategies, even when the space of feasible payoffs is not convex. At such an equilibrium there is no delay. We also have the converse result that randomization will not be used in this environment in the sense that all stationary subgame perfect equilibria do not ...

An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players

Shapley proved the existence of an ordinal, symmetric and efficient solution for three-player bargaining problems. Ordinality refers to the covariance of the solution with respect to orderpreserving transformations of utilities. The construction of this solution is based on a special feature of the three-player utility space: given a Pareto surface in this space, each utility vector is the idea...

Anthropometry and Somatotype of Pre-adolescent Soccer Players: Comparisons amongst Elite, Sub-elite and Non-elite Players with Non-players

The aim of the present study was to compare the anthropometry and somatotype of pre-adolescent soccer players of a wide range of levels and ages, and boys of the general population, in order to defi ne the most relevant anthropometric characteristics related to success and promotion to youth soccer elite levels. To this end, 528 youngsters (11.9±0.3 years) divided in four different age groups (...

Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players∗