Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty

Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty

The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others’ preferences. This paper explores, within the context of an infinite-horizon bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible. Since ...

Two-sided Matching with Incomplete Information∗

Stability in a two-sided matching model with non-transferrable utility and with incomplete information is investigated. Each agent has interdependent preferences which depend on his own type and on the possibly unknown types of agents on the other side of the market. In a one-sided incomplete information model in which workers’ types are private information, a firm joins a worker in a block to ...

A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information

We study the equilibrium outcomes of two-person bargaining problems in which each party has “outside option” known only to himself. We examin two game forms, a sequential-move game and a simulteneous-move game. In this context we discuss the failure to reach agreements and the loss of efficiency thereof. Invoking the analogy between the sequentialmove game and the familiar ultimatum game we als...

Department of Economics Alternating-offer Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information

Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market to trade. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched wit...